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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 2000292-CA 
v. : 
PEDRO ARBALLO, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals his first degree felony convictions for 
aggravated robbery. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) and (4) (1996) 
and § 78-2a-3(j) (1996) give this Court jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW1 
1. Did defendant affirmatively waive his appellate 
challenge to a voir dire comment the trial judge made? 
An affirmative waiver bars appellate review unless defendant 
establishes that counsel performed ineffectively for waiving the 
claim. See, e.g., State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 
1989), cert, denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990); State v. Morgan, 813 
P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah App. 1991). 
xIn violation of Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5), defendant failed 
to include a record citation to where he preserved his appellate 
claim or to argue a basis for appellate review of his unpreserved 
claim. 
2. Alternatively, has defendant established plain error in 
the voir dire statement that he challenges for the first time on 
appeal? 
Defendant did not preserve the appellate claim; therefore, 
the Court may only review the claim for plain error. See, e.g., 
State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51 f 6, 4 P.3d 778. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1999) is attached as addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with three counts of aggravated 
robbery, first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-302 (1999) (R. 1-6). 
A jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 46-48). The trial 
court sentenced defendant to the statutory pirison terms of five 
years to life on all three counts and imposed statutory firearm 
enhancements (R. 108-110). The Court ordered concurrent 
sentences on the robberies and concurrent sentences on the 
enhancements, but ordered that the enhancement sentences would be 
consecutive to the robbery sentences (id.). 
Defendant timely filed his notice of appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court (R. 114) . The supreme court transferred the case 
to this Court (R. 130). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On appeal, petitioner argues only that a comment the trial 
2 
judge made during voir dire so tainted the panel that this Court 
must reverse. Consequently, the facts underlying the criminal 
charges have no relevance to defendant's single appellate claim. 
Early in the jury voir dire, prospective juror Jackson 
informed the trial court that he had served on a jury in Phoenix 
twelve years earlier (R. 142 at 12). Mr. Jackson reported that 
the Phoenix jury could not reach unanimity, with the vote 
splitting eleven to one in favor of conviction (id. at 13). 
The following exchange then occurred: 
The Court: I see. [The hold-out juror] must have 
been Archie Bunker's wife, Edith. 
Mr. Gravis [defense counsel]: Not necessarily. 
The Court: Not necessarily. That - well, that's a 
good point, Mr. Gravis 
(id.). Defense counsel did not object to the statement. 
At the end of voir dire, Mr. Gravis asked the prospective 
jurors about the "Edith Bunker" comment: 
Mr. Gravis: Now, there was - during the prior voir 
dire there was talk about a hung jury. In ^a jury case 
- trial it requires - a criminal case requires a 
unanimous jury verdict to enter a conviction. Would 
any of you feel compelled not to feel like an Edith 
Bunker if you disagree with everybody else and want to 
go home and whatever they want to do to - and give up 
your own convictions? 
(No response) 
Mr. Gravis: You each would be willing to stand by 
your convictions, your position, no matter if it's 
seven to one against and - and you wouldn't give into 




Mr. Gravis: Okay. Nothing further, Your Honor 
(id. at 60) .2 These were the last voir dire questions asked of 
the prospective jurors. After defense counsel asked them, he 
passed the panel for cause (id. at 61). 
Before the trial began, the trial court instructed the 
jurors: 1) to base their verdict on the evidence and the law; 2) 
to keep an open mind during the trial and to form no opinions 
about defendant's guilt or innocence until they heard all the 
evidence, the closing arguments, and the legal instructions; and 
3) not to infer that the court had any opinion about the case's 
merits based on any of the court's comments; 4) that they were 
the sole judges of the facts, and that the court could not invade 
that responsibility; and 5) to keep an open mind until they 
retired to deliberate the case (R. 56-58; R. L24 at 7). 
In the instructions at the close of evidence, the trial 
court further instructed the jury: 1) to decide the case on the 
facts and law without regard to sympathy, passion, or prejudice; 
2) to decide the case only on the evidence from witnesses and 
exhibits and to disregard anything heard from any other source; 
3) that the court had no intention to give any hint about the 
2At the beginning of the voir dire, the trial court had 
instructed the jury that not responding to a question asked to 
the entire panel would indicate that there was "no problem" with 
the question (id. at 2) . 
4 
verdict the jurors should return; that the court did not wish to 
influence the jurors' verdict in any way; that only the jurors 
could determine the proper verdict; that it would be improper for 
the court to influence the verdict; and that the jurors should 
disregard any comments suggesting the court preferred a 
particular verdict, believed certain witnesses, or considered 
certain evidence more important; and 4) to select a foreperson, 
but not to allow the foreperson to dominate the jury (R. 71, 78, 
80, 94) . 
The court also instructed the jurors-'that they had a duty to 
deliberate with a "view to reaching an agreement," but that they 
"should not surrender [their] honest convictions concerning the 
effect or weight of evidence for the mere purpose of returning a 
verdict or solely because of the opinion of the other jurors" (R. 
96) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Trial counsel affirmatively waived defendant's only 
appellate claim when he addressed the "Edith Bunker" comment in 
voir dire, then passed the panel for cause when no prospective 
juror indicated the comment would affect his or her vote. On 
appeal, defendant has not argued that trial counsel performed 
ineffectively for making that choice. The affirmative waiver and 
absence of an ineffectiveness claim bars appellate relief based 
on the comment. 
5 
Alternatively, defendant did not preserve the claim; 
therefore, he may succeed only by establishing plain error. 
Plain error does not justify appellate relief for two independent 
reasons. First, defendant has not argued plain error. 
Second, defendant cannot establish that, absent the "Edith 
Bunker" comment, there would exist a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable result. The trial court immediately retreated 
from the comment; defense counsel's voir dire established that it 
would not affect the jurors' ability to vote against their 
convictions; and the jury instructions clearly instructed the 
jurors on their responsibilities, including their responsibility 




DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED HIS APPELLATE CLAIM WHEN 
HIS TRIAL-COUNSEL CHOSE TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE 
COMMENT TAINTED THE PANEL, THEN CONCLUDED IT HAD NOT; 
HIS WAIVER BARS APPELLATE REVIEW 
When defense counsel declines to object to an error for 
tactical reasons, defendant may not obtain appellate relief based 
on that error, even if the error amounts to plain error. See, 
e.g., State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 716-18 (Utah App. 1997), cert, denied, 953 
P.2d 449 (Utah 1998); State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210-11 
(Utah App. 1991). The Court may infer from the record whether 
6 
counsel failed to object for tactical reasons even though trial 
counsel may not have expressly waived the objection. See State 
v. Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158-59 (inferring an affirmative waiver 
of a hearsay objection because waiving the objection was 
consistent with trial strategy); State v. Hall, 942 P.2d at 717-
18 (finding an affirmative waiver of a hearsay objection because 
the admitted evidence was integral to the defendant's case). 
The record establishes that trial counsel affirmatively 
chose not to object to the "Edith Bunker" comment. The comment 
did not merely slip by counsel. Counsel pointed out to the trial 
court, in front of the jury, that a hold-out juror was "not 
necessarily" an Edith Bunker (R. 142 at 13). 
Trial counsel used his last two direct voir dire questions 
to determine whether the comment had tainted the prospective 
jurors' ability to render individual verdicts (id. at 60). The 
responses apparently satisfied counsel because he ended his voir 
dire and passed the panel for cause (id. at 60-61). Counsel's 
decision to query further about any taint and subsequent 
conclusion that no taint existed affirmatively waived defendant's 
claim that the comment was reversible error. 
Although the affirmative waiver precludes reversal even for 
plain error, it does not preclude reversal if counsel's waiver 
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., State 
v. Bullock, 791 P.2d at 159-60. Defendant does not claim that 
7 
counsel's decision violated his Sixth Amendment right to the 
effective assistance of counsel. 
Because trial counsel affirmatively waived the only 
appellate claim, and because defendant has not argued, let alone 
established, ineffective assistance of counsel, he has presented 
the Court with no cognizable basis for reversing his conviction. 
POINT II 
ALTERNATIVELY, THE TRIAL COURT'S VOIR DIRE COMMENT DOES 
NOT WARRANT REVERSAL EVEN UNDER A PLAIN ERROR ANALYSIS 
As stated, defendant did not object to the "Edith Bunker" 
comment. If this Court does not agree that he affirmatively 
waived the objection, it may reverse only if the comment amounted 
to plain error. See State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51 f6, 4 P.3d 778 
(trial counsel's failure to object to judge's comment during voir 
dire limited appellate review to plain error). To establish 
plain error, defendant must demonstrate: 1) the comment was 
erroneous; 2) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and 3) a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result 
would exist if the trial court had not made the comment. Jd. at 
17. 
Plain error does not justify reversal in this case. First, 
petitioner has not argued plain error on appeal; instead, he 
treats the issue as though he preserved it below. Defendant's 
failure to argue plain error independently defeats his appellate 
challenge to the unobjected-to comment. State v. Sepulveda, 842 
8 
P.2d 913, 917-18*. (Utah App. 1992) . 
Second, as in Parser, defendant cannot establish that, 
absent the ill-conceived comment, there would exist the 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result.3 The^State 
charged Parker with murder for stabbing his victim with a five 
inch blade. State v. Parker, %%2, 4. During voir dire, the 
trial judge showed the prospective jurors his pocket knife with a 
three inch blade and commented that it "was 'probably as thick a 
pocket knife that a fellow really ought to carry.'" Id. f 4. 
On appeal, Parker contended that the comment discounted his 
self-defense theory because it suggested that he had no 
legitimate reason to carry the knife used to kill the victim. 
Relying solely on an instruction admonishing the jury not to be 
influenced by any comment the judge made, the supreme court found 
any error harmless. 
The comment in this case presents even less potential for 
prejudice than the one found harmless in Parker. First, the 
trial court immediately retreated from the comment after making 
it. When the trial court quipped that the hold-out juror in the 
Phoenix case must have been "Edith Bunker," defense counsel 
responded, "Not necessarily." The trial court acknowledged that 
defense counsel had made a "good point." (R. 142 at 13). 
3By relying on the third element of the plain error 
analysis, the State does not concede that any error in the 
comment was obvious. 
Second, defense counsel's voir dire assured that the comment 
did not have the effect about which defendant now complains: 
telling the prospective jurors that a hold-out juror is a 
"dingbat." Defense counsel inquired whether the jurors would 
feel like an "Edith Bunker" if they reached a conclusion 
different from the other jurors, and whether each could stand by 
his convictions even if he were a single hold-out (id. at 60). 
The prospective jurors indicated that they could do so (id.). 
Finally, as in Parker, the jury instructions negated any 
possible prejudicial effect from the comment. Those instructions 
stressed the jurors' duties, among others, to decide the case on 
the law and evidence, not passion or prejudice. They reminded 
the jurors that only they, not the judge, had the authority to 
determine the verdict; and admonished them not to regard any 
comment from the judge as an indication of his opinion of the 
evidence or the proper verdict. (R. 57-58, 61, 68, 71, 78, 80, 
94.) 
Most importantly, the trial court instructed the jury that, 
while they should deliberate with "a view to reaching agreement," 
they were not to surrender their honest convictions for "the mere 
purpose of returning a verdict or solely because of the opinion 
of the other jurors" (R. 96). Thus, while the judge's quip may 
have suggested a personal opinion about hold-out jurors, the 
instructions clearly informed each juror not to vote in conflict 
10 
with his or her honest convictions and not to vote in a way that 
the juror might think the judge wanted him or her to vote. 
The judge's immediate retreat from the comment, the 
prospective jurors' denial that it would affect anyone's vote, 
and the instructions obligating each to vote in according to his 
or her convictions without regard to the judge's comments 
establishes that no reasonable likelihood of a more favorable 
result would exist if the judge had not made the comment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued above, the Court should affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
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ADDENDUM A 
764-302. Aggravated robbery. 
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing 
robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 
76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes an operable motor vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered to be "in tk 
course of committing a robbery* if it occurs in an attempt to commit, during tht 
commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
History: C. 1953, 76-6402, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, $ 76-6-302; 1976, ch. 61, § 1; 
1969, ch. 170, } 7; 1994, ch. 271, § 1. 
